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ST. LOUIS
LAW REVIEW
Vol. XV APRIL, 1930 No. 3
PARTNERSHIPS IN BANKRUPTCY
By HAROLD S. COOK
Since the passage of the Bankruptcy Act of 18981 the bank-
ruptcy law of partnerships has undergone most radical changes.
In fact, the entire theory of the law prior to the Act of 1898 was
modified by Congress therein. This in turn has necessitated the
building of a new structure of case law on the base provided by
the legislative enactment.
As is the case with all new statutes, novel situations have
arisen which have tested the ingenuity of counsel and of the
courts. Many of such questions have been settled only by re-
sort to the Supreme Court; others, equally difficult, are not yet
in that satisfactory condition.
It is the purpose of this article to discuss some of the high
lights in the judicial construction of that part of the 1898 Act
relating to partnerships. It would require a volume to- consider,
or even merely mention, all the cases; only a few of the most
interesting can be discussed.
Bankruptcy Act of 1898
The Act provides that "'persons' shall include . . . partner-
ships." This definition is the basis for the holding of the Su-
preme Court that a partnership is a legal entity, a judicial per-
son, within the purview of the Bankruptcy Act. The Act fur-
ther provides that "A partnership, during the continuation of
the partnership business, or after its dissolution and before the
final settlement thereof, may be adjudged a bankrupt.' As
1 U. S. C. Title 11.
'11 U. S. C. sec. 1 (19).
'11 U. S. C. sec. 23 (a).
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pointed out by Mr. Justice Sanford in Liberty National Bank v.
Bear,4 this section differs radically from the corresponding sec-
tion (36) of the Act of 1867 (and also from sec. 14 of the Act
of 1841) which did not permit the adjudication of a partnership
as a legal entity, but merely authorized an adjudication of "per-
sons who are partners in trade."',
The two prior Acts required that all partners be adjudged
bankrupts before the assignee could administer the joint estate.
In other words, the partnership did not exist apart from the
members composing it.
The radical change made by the 1898 Act indicates the evi-
dent intention of Congress to designate a partnership as a legal
entity, a legal "person," for the purposes of bankruptcy. This
intention the Supreme Court has clearly declared., It can at
this date no longer be considered a disputed point, and any de-
cisions of the lower Federal Courts to the contrary, if not ex-
pressly, are at least impliedly overruled by these decisions.
Insolvency of Partnerships
Assuming, then, that a partnership as such may be adjudged
a bankrupt, it must next be considered when it may be so ad-
judged.7 Sec. 3 (b) of the 1898 Act provides that "A petition
may be filed against a person who is insolvent and who has
committed an act of bankruptcy within four months after the
commission of such act."8 The acts of bankruptcy are set forth
in sec. 3 (a).9 Of the six acts so set forth, three do not require
insolvency as an essential element.
It has been held by the Supreme Court that where the act of
bankruptcy relied on does not require insolvency as an essential
element, the provision of sec. 3 (b) above set forth does not re-
quire that insolvency at the time of the filing of the petition be
alleged or proved.10  As Mr. Justice White remarks, "It fol-
' (1928) 276 U. S. 215.
'In re Carleton (D. C. Mass. 1902) 115 F. 246.
1 Francis v. McNeal (1913) 228 U. S. 695; Meek v. Centre County Bank-
ing Co. (1925) 268 U. S. 426; Liberty National Bank v. Bear, supra note 4.
'See note (1929) 14 ST. Louis L. Rnv. 179.
'11 U. S. C. sec. 21 (b).
11 U. S. C. see. 21 (a) as amended May 27, 1926, c. 406 sec. 3, 44 Stat.
662.
"West Co. v. Lea (1899) 174 U. S. 590.
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lows that the mere statement in the statute, by way of recital,
that a petition may be filed 'against a person who is insolvent
and who has committed an act of bankruptcy,' was not designed
to superadd a further requirement to those contained in para-
graph (a) of section 3, as to what should constitute acts of
bankruptcy."
But as to those acts of bankruptcy which require "the in-
solvency of the debtor to be an essential concomitant," it be-
comes necessary to consider the question: When is a partner-
ship insolvent?
As defined by the Act itself,- a person is deemed insolvent
whenever the aggregate of his property, exclusive of any prop-
erty which he may have conveyed, transferred, concealed or re-
moved, or permitted to be concealed or removed, with intent to
defraud, hinder or delay his creditors, shall not, at a fair valua-
tion, be sufficient in amount to pay his debts. At common law
and under the provisions of the Uniform Partnership Act, each
and every partner-excluding, of course, the case of a limited
partner-is liable for all of the debts of the partnership. 12 How,
then, can a partnership be insolvent unless all of the partners
are insolvent? If any partner is solvent, that is, has sufficient
assets, over and above his individual debts, to satisfy all part-
nership obligations, then the partnership is not insolvent. As
Mr. Justice Holmes said in Francis v. McNeal,"s "But the fact
remains as true as ever that partnership debts are debts of the
members of the firm, and that the individual liability of the
members is not collateral like that of a surety, but primary and
direct, whatever priorities there may be in the marshaling of as-
sets. The nature of the liability is determined by the common
law, not by the possible intervention of the Bankruptcy Act.
Therefore, ordinarily it would be impossible that a firm should
be insolvent while the members of it remain able to pay its debts
with money available for that end. A judgment could be got
and the partnership debts satisfied on execution out of the indi-
vidual assets.""
11 11 U. S. C. sec. 1 (15).
"Burdick, PARTNERSHIP (3rd ed.) 155; U. P. A. sec. 15.
"Note 6, above 1. c. 699-700.
"' Italics ours.
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Therefore, it naturally follows that under the Bankruptcy Act
a partnership cannot be adjudged bankrupt while any of its
members continues solvent, and this seems to be the holding of a
great majority of the adjudicated cases.'5
The decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the 8th Cir-
cuit, In re Bertenshaw,"'6 in so far as it announces a contrary
rule, was expressly overruled by the Supreme Court in Francis
v. McNeal, supra, and any decisions of the lower Federal Courts
based on the decision in the Bertenshaw case are, therefore, also
impliedly overkuled.
It has been held likewise, as a logical result of the conclusion
reached above, that an allegation of the insolvency of the part-
nership necessarily implies an allegation of the insolvency of
the partners.' 7
Adjudication of Partnership as Necessary Adjudication of
Partners
It does not necessarily follow from the conclusion that in-
solvency of the partnership necessarily involves the insolvency
of the partners, that an adjudication of the partnership as a
bankrupt likewise involves, as a necessary concomitant, the ad-
judication of each partner as such.2' The confusion of insol-
vency and bankruptcy has, without doubt, caused some of the
District Courts at times to go astray in their decisions. This
confusion has been abetted by a misunderstanding of the true
effect of sec. 5 (h) of the Bankruptcy Act.'
It is now conclusively settled by the Supreme Court's decision
in Liberty National Bank of Roanoke -v. Bear, Trustee,'20 that
the adjudication of a partnership as a bankrupt does not amount
"Francis v. McNeal, supra note 6; Vaccaro v. Memphis Security Bank
(C. C. A. 6, 1900) 103 F. 436; Tumlin v. Bryan (C. C. A. 5, 1908) 165 F.
166; In re Young (D. C. Mass. 1915) 223 F. 659; Titus v. Maxwell (C. C. A.
6, 1922) 281 F. 433; In re Fuller (C. C. A. 2,1925) 9 F. (2d) 553; In re Rus-
sell (D. C. Del. 1926) 13 F. (2d) 928; Baker v. Bates-Street Shirt Co. (C.
C. A. 1, 1925) 6 F. (2d) 854.
"(C. C. A. 8, 1907) 157 F. 363.
"'Meek v. Beezer (C. C. A. 3, 1928) 28 F. (2d) 343 1. c. 347. Certiorari
denied (1929) 278 U. S. 651.
See note (1928) 14 ST. Louis L. REv. 57.
"11 U. S. C. see. 23 (h).
(1928) 276 U. S. 215.
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to an adjudication of bankruptcy against the partners as indi-
viduals. Mr. Justice Sanford, in his opinion in this case, to
which there was no dissent, remarks that this has long been the
established rule in the Circuit Courts of Appeals and District
Courts, noting only a contrary decision of the District Court for
Massachusetts.21
Under the present Act, which clearly recognizes the partner-
ship entity for bankruptcy purposes, such a decision was im-
perative. There have been cases where the partners, or one or
more of them, could not have been adjudged bankrupt, either be-
cause they had not committed acts of bankruptcy, because they
were exempt from involuntary bankruptcy, being wage earners
or engaged chiefly in farming or the tillage of the soil, or because
they were insane or minors. In fact, this is one of the notable
defects in the prior Acts which was remedied by the 1898 Act.
Francis v. McNeal did not involve the question here discussed,
and can in no sense, as Mr. Justice Sanford points out, be said
to conflict with the decision in Liberty National Bank v. Bear.
It is true that several of the lower courts have been troubled by
the remark of Mr. Justice Holmes in the former case that "we
do not perceive that the clause imports that the partnership
could be in bankruptcy and the partners not." But Mr. Justice
Holmes by the word "clause" referred to sec. 5 (h) of the Act,
which covers the situation where one or more, but not all of
the members of the partnership are adjudged bankrupt. "In
that case, naturally," says Holmes, "the partnership property
may be administered by the partners not adjudged bankrupt,
and does not come into bankruptcy at all, except by consent.
But we do not perceive that the clause imports that the partner-
ship could be in bankruptcy, and the partners not. The hypothe-
sis is that some of the partners are in, but that the firm has re-
mained out, and provision is made for its continuing out."
Adjudication After Dissolution
Inasmuch as the section of the Act above quoted permits the
adjudication of a partnership even after dissolution, but before
the final settlement thereof, the courts have quite uniformly held
In re Forbes (D. C. Mass. 1904) 128 F. 137.
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that a partnership may be adjudicated in bankruptcy even after
the death of one of the partners.22
And where the state statute, as in Illinois, makes the surviv-
ing partner trustee of the partnership assets for the purpose of
collecting them and paying the creditors, he may file a voluntary
petition in bankruptcy on behalf of the firm. 23
In such cases, of course, the estate of the deceased partner is
necessarily administered in the Probate Court, the administra-
tor being required to pay any surplus remaining after the satis-
faction of individual debts to the Trustee in Bankruptcy, and on
the other hand, the latter being required to pay any equity of
the deceased partner in partnership assets remaining after firm
creditors have been satisfied, to the executor or administrator as
the case may be.2 4
Appointment of Trustee
The creditors of the partnership shall appoint the trus-
tee; in other respects, so far as possible, the estate shall be
administered as herein provided for other estates. 25
Although there are no specific provisions in the Act regulat-
ing the appointment of separate trustees for partnership and
individual estates, it would seem to be proper in the normal case
to appoint the same trustee for firm and individual estates. This
would avoid confusion and expense. The matter, however, is
discretionary with the court, and in extraordinary cases sep-
arate trustees may be appointed.2 1
Where an individual trustee has been appointed prior to the
adjudication of the firm, the appointment of a firm trustee does
not vacate the prior appointment.27
'In re Wells (D. C. Ohio 1924) 298 F. 109; In re Lomont (D. C. Ind.
1925) 9 F. (2d) 407; Meek v. Beezer (C. C. A. 3, 1928) 28 F. (2d) 343.
Certiorari denied (1929) 278 U. S. 651.
In re Salladay (D. C. Ill. 1927) 22 F. (2d) 300.
24 See cases in note 22, above.11 U. S. C. sec. 23 (b).
"In re Currie (D. C. Mich. 1910) 197 F. 1012; In re Wood (C. C. A. 6,
1918) 248 F. 246. Certiorari denied (1918) 247 U. S. 512; In re Russell
(D. C. Del. 1928) 28 F. (2d) 48.
In re Deadwyler (D. C. Ga. 1923) 292 F. 510.
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Jurisdiction of Bankruptcy Court
The Court of Bankruptcy which has jurisdiction of one
of the partners may have jurisdiction of all the partners
and of the administration of the partnership and individual
property. 8
Under the BankruptcyAct of 1867,two or more partners in trade
might be adjudged bankrupt upon their petition or the petition of
"any one of them .''-1 There being no corresponding provision in
the present Act, it is settled that a court cannot entertain an in-
voluntary petition for adjudication of a firm where the petition
is filed by only one partner.-- The holding in this case was clear,
since an involuntary petition under the present Act may be filed
only by creditors. The Court expressly refused to consider the
question as to the right of one partner to file a voluntary peti-
tion for the firm in its behalf without an affirmative showing
that it was filed at the instance or with the consent of the other
partners.91
Although there is some conflict in the decisions of the lower
Federal Courts because of the provisions of General Order VIII.,
which was drawn by the Supreme Court in compliance with the
terms of the 1867 Act, and which was expressly revoked by the
Supreme Court in the Meek case, supra, as not fitted to the terms
of the 1898 Act, and although the question is still an open one, it
seems clear that a voluntary petition in bankruptcy by a part-
nership must be signed either by all the partners, or if signed
by less than the whole number, must show on its face the con-
sent of those not signing, or some special reason why they have
not joined in the petition. As was said by the District Court
for the Fort Worth Division of the Northern District of Texas
in a well-reasoned case,
Inasmuch as the filing of a voluntary petition in bank-
ruptcy is, as against the partners individually, equivalent to
a general assignment of the partnership property for the
benefit of creditors, and amounts to a confession of judg-
ment as to the debts placed upon the schedules, puts an end
"11 U. S. C. see. 23 (c).
0 14 Stat. 517 c. 176 sec. 36.
- Meek v. Centre County Banking Co. (1925) 268 U. S. 426.
I d. 1. c. 432.
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to the partnership, and would involve the individual estates
of the partners under their solidary liability as such, I can-
not conceive that any number less than all of the partners
could legally take such a drastic step without the consent
of the others, and certainly not over their objection...
I am of the view that, not only is the showing made by
Bateman in the motion to dismiss amply sufficient to justify
the dismissal of the petition as to the partnership, but be-
lieve that, in order to justify a court of bankruptcy in mak-
ing a voluntary adjudication of a partnership, it would be
necessary, either that all of the partners join therein or that
clear showing be made of their consent to such proceeding,
or at least that the petition disclose the impossibility of
their being joined, or of obtaining their consent, such as
their having absconded, etc.32
Administration of Individual Property by Firm Trustee Where
Partners Not Adjudicated
Upon the adjudication in bankruptcy of the firm, the trustee
may administer not only the firm assets, but also all the assets
of the individual partners if necessary to pay firm debts. The
trustee may petition the Court for an order directing any or all
of the partners to turn over their separate assets for adminis-
tration.3 3 And this is true, regardless of the adjudication of
any of the partners individually.34
In such a case, the creditors of the partnership may prove
their claims against the estates of the individual partners, as
well as against the partnership estate, and vice versa, but such
claims take only the surplus, if any, remaining after the indi-
vidual or partnership creditors, as the case may be, have been
paid in full.35
It has been held in line with the Supreme Court's ruling in
Francis v. McNeaI that the partners, although not adjudicated,
' In re York et al. (D. C. Tex. 1926) 18 F. (2d) 428. But see apparently
contra: In re Lenoir-Cross & Co. (D. C. Tenn. 1915) 226 F. 227; In re
Hansley & Adams (D. C. Cal. 1916) 228 F. 564.
' Francis v. McNeal, supra note 6.
"Francis v. McNeal, supra note 6; Menke v. Sundermann (C. C. A. 3,
1911) 186 F. 486; Abbott v. Anderson (1914) 265 Ill. 285, 106 N. E. 782;
Carter v. Whisler (C. C. A. 8, 1921) 275 F. 743.
'In re Rice (D. C. Pa. 1908) 164 F. 509; In re Effinger (D. C. Md. 1911)
184 F. 728; In re Telfer (C. C. A. 6, 1910) 184 F. 224.
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must file schedules of their separate property and debts, so that
any excess can be reached.
This does not mean that the individual partners are to
be dealt with in all respects as if themselves bankrupts,
but means only that they, being the components of the bank-
rupt partnership, are fully under the control of the court as
parties, and that they, being fully liable for the partnership
debts, are under duty to present to the court and to make
available the excess of individual property over individual
debts, which excess is an asset of the partnership. . The
administration, to the individual creditors, in other words,
would not be an administration in bankruptcy, but a mar-
shalling under general equity principles for the purpose of
ascertaining and securing that which is to be administered
in bankruptcy.36
Trustee's Accounts
The Trustee shall keep separate accounts of the partner-
ship property and of the property belonging to the indi-
vidual partners. 37
This provision is self-explanatory, and was inserted in the
Act only to avoid confusion. Since the decision in Francis v.
MeNeal, it is, of course, of added importance, since, regardless
of the adjudication of the individual partners, their separate
estates may be taken by the trustee of the partnership and ad-
ministered.
A failure of the trustee to comply with the provisions of this
section cannot affect the rights of individual and firm creditors.
Where a trustee deposited the proceeds of the sale of a New
York Stock Exchange seat belonging to one of the partners in a
bank account kept in the name of the firm, individual creditors
could reach such proceeds by proper petition and have them al-
located to the individual estate of the partner.3 8
Expenses
The expenses shall be paid from the partnership property
and the individual property in such proportions as the court
shall determine29
' In re Sugar Valley Gin Co. (D. C. Ga. 1923) 292 F. 508. See also Arm-
strong v. Fisher (C. C. A. 8, 1915) 224 F. 97.
'" 11 U. S. C. sec. 23 (d).
In re Amy et al. (C. C. A. 2, 1927) 21 F. (2d) 301.
* 11 U. S. C. see. 23 (e).
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Several cases have considered the troublesome question as to
whether referee, trustee and clerk are entitled to only one fee
or more upon the filing of a petition for adjudication of both
partnership and partners. The Act provides that certain fees
are payable to trustee and referee in each "case" and to clerks
for their services to each "estate."
It would seem reasonable to allow several fees although only
one petition is filed, where such petition prays several adjudica-
tions, or even in a case where individual discharges were grant-
ed, although not prayed for in the petition.40 The Circuit Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, however, has distinguished be-
tween a "case" and an "estate," holding that the filing of a peti-
tion for adjudication of both partnership and partners was the
institution of a "case" involving several "estates."141 This rul-
ing seems untenable.
Distribution
The net proceeds of the partnership property shall be ap-
propriated to the payment of the partnership debts, and the
net proceeds of the individuhl estate of each partner to the
payment of his individual debts. Should any surplus re-
main of the property of any partner after paying his indi-
vidual debts, such surplus shall be added to the partnership
assets and be applied to the payment of the partnership
debts. Should any surplus of the partnership property re-
main after paying the partnership debts, such surplus shall
be added to the assets of the individual partners in the pro-
portion of their respective interests in the partnership.42
This section is but a restatement of the equity principles in
reference to the marshalling of partnership assets. The corre-
sponding provision of the Uniform Partnership Act (sec. 40
(h)) is similar. Under the Uniform Partnership Act the lia-
bilities of a partnership rank in order of payment as follows:
1. Those owing to creditors other than partners;
2. Those owing to partners other than for capital and
profits;
3. Those owing to partners in respect of capital;
'In re Borden (D. C. N. C. 1900) 101 F. 553; In re Farley (D. C. Va.
1902) 115 F. 359. But see In re Rider (D. C. Mont. 1915) 220 F. 193.
"Willis v. Hart (C. C. A. 5, 1926) 11 F. (2d) 530.
"11 U. S. C. see. 23 (f).
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4. Those owing to partners in respect of profits ;43
and the liabilities of each partner rank in order of payment as
follows:
1. Those owing to separate creditors;
2. Those owing to partnership creditors;
3. Those owing to partners by way of contribution. 4 4
It is often difficult to determine which debts are firm debts,
and which individual. In some cases the obligation may be
joint and several and the creditor may prove his claim both
against the individual and firm estates, obtaining, of course, only
one satisfaction. The cases dealing with the nature of firm and
individual obligations are legion, and it is beyond the scope of
this article to consider all phases of the question.
The principles of this section are well illustrated in a case de-
cided by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,"
where one of the partners of a bankrupt partnership was itself
a partnership. It was held that creditors of the partner part-
nership must be paid in full before any of the assets of such
partner could be available to creditors of the bankrupt firm.40
It has been lately held in a case where both the firm and its
members were adjudicated bankrupts, that obligations held by a
creditor containing the signature of the firm as well as the indi-
vidual signatures of the partners as sureties, created a double
liability, and that such a creditor had a right to prove his claim
against both separate and firm estates. It was objected that
sec. 5 (f) of the Bankruptcy Act, by appropriating the indi-
vidual estate of a partner to his individual debts, impliedly ex-
cluded debts that were also partnership obligations from shar-
ing with the former on equal terms. But Mr. Justice Holmes
logically points out that as there was nothing in the state laws
prohibiting the individual partners from creating claims against
their individual estates by their separate contracts, certainly
there was no prohibition in the Bankruptcy Act.
The firm creditors know that they will be postponed to
'U. P. A. sec. 40 (b).
"U. P. A. sec. 40 (i).
"In re Knowlton & Co. (C. C. A. 3, 1913) 202 F. 480.
Accord, Bank of Reidsville v. Barton (C. C. A. 4, 1919) 259 F. 218.
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individual creditors, and that they have no voice or knowl-
edge as to who the individual creditors shall be, or what the
amount of their claims. The only real equity is not to dis-
turb the equilibrium established by the parties. Those who
take less security have no claim to be put on a footing with
those who require more. It is not necessary to go into nice
speculations as to what a partner can add to the liability
already incurred when he offers a separate contract in addi-
tion to that which is made by his firm. We may assume
that by the firm contract he is bound to the uttermost far-
thing-but he is bound only as a member of the firm, and
therefore subject to the bankruptcy rule. His creditor may
require more, and we can see nothing to hinder his putting
himself in the position of a separate debtor also.41
For a long time there was a serious conflict of decisions in the
Federal Courts respecting the question as to the right of firm
creditors to share ratably with individual creditors of one part-.
ner, where there were no firm assets and no solvent partners,
the only fund for distribution being produced by the individual
estate of one member. The English courts had allowed such a
proceeding, engrafting it as an exception on the general rule as
to the marshaling of assets. The question finally reached the
Supreme Court, which, in a lucid opinion by Mr. Chief Justice
White, held that in such a case the statute was clear and manda-
tory, and the individual creditors were entitled to priority in the
distribution of the fund, to the exclusion of firm creditors.4
Discharge
One of the most puzzling problems with which the courts have
had to deal since the passage of the 1898 Act has been that re-
lating to the granting of discharges to the firm and to individual
partners so far as firm debts are concerned. The Act merely
provides that "Any person may, after the expiration of one
month, and within the next twelve months, subsequent to being
adjudged a bankrupt, file an application for a discharge . . ."41
Of course, if the firm as an entity has been adjudicated, it may
"'Mitchell v. Hampel (1928) 276 U. S. 299.
1 Farmers' & Mechanics' National Bank of Philadelphia v. Ridge Ave.
Bank (1916) 240 U. S. 498.
1111 U. S. C. sec. 32 (a).
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be discharged upon proper application therefor, from all lia-
bility for provable firm debts except those specifically mentioned
in the Act.50 Likewise, the individual partners may be discharged
in the usual way from both individual and firm debts, provided
they have been separately adjudicated and have listed the firm
debts as liabilities.
The interesting and troublesome question remains as to
whether a discharge of the firm carries with it a discharge of
the individual partners from individual liability for firm debts,
although they have not been separately adjudicated bankrupts.
If the premise is true, that the adjudication of the firm neces-
sarily implies the insolvency of the partners (where the Act of
Bankruptcy involves insolvency) and if each partner, after his
individual creditors are satisfied, is liable in toto to firm credi-
tors for firm debts, then a discharge of the firm as an entity
should necessarily carry with it a discharge of the individual
partners so far as their individual liability for firm debts is
concerned. This logical conclusion has not as yet been reached
by the Federal Courts, which are in irreconcilable conflict. Un-
til the exact question is decided by the Supreme Court, it is im-
possible to say what the law is, except for particular circuits,
but it is submitted that the Supreme Court will ultimately hold
that a discharge of the firm necessarily discharges its members
from their individual liability for firm debts where their indi-
vidual estates have been taken into custody by the trustee and
marshalled in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the
decision in Francis v. McNeal.
A contrary conclusion has been reached by several of the
lower courts, most of the decisions having been rendered prior
to Francis v. McNeal. For instance, the Circuit Court of Ap-
peals for the Eighth Circuit has held that a discharge of the
firm does not discharge the partners from their individual lia-
bility for firm debts." This holding is based upon the theory
that since a partnership may be adjudicated bankrupt where
some of the partners are solvent, and since the trustee may only
administer the partnership assets (both of which postulates
"11 U. S. C. sec. 35.
" In re Bertenshaw (C. C. A. 8, 1907) 157 F. 363 1. c. 369.
Washington University Open Scholarship
ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
have since been held false by the Supreme Court) the discharge
cannot affect the liability of the individuals for firm debts.
Since the basis of this case was overturned by Francis V. Mc-
Neal, the same court which decided In re Bertenshaw has
changed its former ruling in a later decision2 This was a peti-
tion to revise an order of the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Iowa. Partnership creditors in 1913
had filed an involuntary petition in Kansas against B & N,
partners. The petition did not pray an adjudication of B & N
individually. B and N filed answers both as individuals and as a
partnership, admitting the ground charged, and an adjudication
of the firm was made. The schedules revealed only firm cred-
itors and debts, and dividends of about 30% were paid. In 1914
N filed his application praying for his discharge both "as an
individual bankrupt and as a member of said bankrupt firm."
This application was never heard, and no other application by
the firm or either partner was ever made in the Kansas court.
In 1915 N fied a voluntary petition in the Southern District
of Iowa and was adjudged bankrupt. The schedules showed no
assets and listed only the firm creditors and debts which had
been listed in the proceeding in Kansas. In January, 1916, peti-
tioners (who were creditors holding claims that were proved
and allowed in Kansas) moved the Iowa court to vacate its
adjudication of N, dismiss the voluntary petition, and enjoin N
from petitioning for a discharge. This motion was denied in
April, the Iowa court holding that N had not been individually
adjudicated bankrupt in Kansas, was not entitled to a discharge
there, and that therefore his failure to procure one did not
bar his proceeding in Iowa. In May the Kansas court on N's
motion entered an order that his petition for discharge might be
withdrawn without prejudice to his right to commence a new
bankruptcy proceeding or to continue one already begun. Peti-
tioners then filed their petition in the Circuit Court of Appeals to
revise the order of the Iowa court made in April.
The Circuit Court of Appeals held that the matter of a dis-
charge in bankruptcy is "essentially a constituent of the proceed-
ing in which the adjudication and the administration of the bank-
Armstrong v. Norris (C. C. A. 8, 1917) 247 F. 253.
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rupt estate are had. It cannot be detached and taken to a court
of another jurisdiction. If Norris was a party to the proceeding
in Kansas, and the court there had jurisdiction to grant or deny
him a discharge from the debts of his firm, that was the tribunal
of exclusive cognizance."
After considering the fact that the adjudication in Kansas was
only of the firm, the court makes this pertinent statement:
Ordinarily it is true that a discharge in bankruptcy im-
plies a prior adjudication of the person discharged, but the
rule should not be applied too literally. When a partner-
ship alone has been adjudged bankrupt, the individual
partners and their estates are drawn into the proceeding
and are subject to the jurisdiction of the court; and when
all the conditions and requirements of the Bankruptcy Act
have been observed by them, jointly and severally, there is
no sound reason why the court should not, upon their ap-
plication in the same proceeding, discharge them from fur-
ther liability for the partnership debts. That is a natural
and logical outcome of such a proceeding, and is consistent
with the long established practice in equity. An adjudica-
tion against the partnership, the necessary relation of the
partners thereto, and the jurisdiction of the court over
them, empowers the court to award them, if they so desire,
the relief which from their standpoint is in the nature of a
final decree.
It is submitted that although a direct ruling was not made, as
the point was not involved, the Circuit Court of Appeals has
practically said in this case that a discharge of the firm dis-
charges the individual members from their liability for firm
debts. The writer is unable to agree with the Court that the
applications of the various members are necessary. It would
seem to be sufficient if an application is made by the firm, the
party adjudicated. In the very nature of things, a discharge of
the firm (which, after all, is not a legal entity, but only a col-
lection of individuals) from its debts, for which each partner is
wholly liable, must necessarily discharge each of the partners
from that liability. As was said by Mr. Justice Holmes in
Francis v. McNeal: -
Finally, it would be a third incongruity to grant a dis-
"Note 6, supra 1. c. 701.
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charge in such a case from the debt considered as joint, but
to leave the same persons liable for it considered as several.
We say the same persons, for however much the difference
between firm and member under the statute be dwelt upon,
the firm remains at common law a group of men, and will
be dealt with as such in the ordinary courts for use in which
the discharge is granted.
On the other hand, it would seem equally clear that unless a
partner is adjudicated a bankrupt individually, he should not
be able to obtain his discharge from his individual debts-as dis-
tinguished from his individual liability for firm debts-even up-
on his application therefor.
It has been lately held by the Supreme Court that a discharge
of a partnership does not constitute a discharge of its members,
so far as their individual debts are concerned.54 But in this case
the Court expressly stated:
We are not called upon to determine whether the dis-
charge of the notes as debts of the partnership which re-
sulted from the confirmation of the composition, carried
with it the discharge of the defendants, as partners, from
the liabilities on the notes as partnership debts which arose
from their membership in the firm."
Homer v. Hamner,55a decided by the Circuit Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit in 1918, is contrary to the theory here ad-
vanced. The decision is based on the reasoning of the Eighth
Circuit in the case of In re Bertenshaw, supra, and although the
Court realizes that the latter case had been expressly disap-
proved by Francis v. McNeal, it remarks that the part of the
decision regarding discharge was not affected by the Supreme
Court's disapproval. As has been shown above, the entire the-
ory on which the Court's decision in the Bertensluw case was
based has been overturned, and it is submitted that the case de-
cided by the Fourth Circuit is not authority for the point now
under discussion.
"5Myers v. International Trust Co. (1927) 273 U. S. 380.
1 Citing In re Coe (C. C. A. 2, 1910) 183 F. '745; Abbott v. Anderson
(1914) 265 Ill. 285, 106 N. E. 782; Curlee Clothing Co. v. Hamm (1923)
160 Ark. 483, 254 S. W. 818; Homer v. Hamner (C. C. A. 4, 1918) 249 F.
134; In re Neyland & M'Keithen (D. C. Miss. 1910) 184 F. 144.
"a See note 55.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol15/iss3/1
PARTNERSHIPS IN BANKRUPTCY
In re Neyland & M'Keithen,5b decided by a District Court of
Mississippi in 1910, follows In re Bertenshaw, but as it was de-
cided prior to Francis v. McNeal, it cannot be considered
seriously.
In re Coe5c was decided by the Circuit Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit in 1910. The firm of Cadenas and Coe, com-
posed of Coe and Knox, was adjudicated bankrupt, together
with the partners. The firm had accepted certain drafts and
trust receipts wherein the partners acknowledged themselves to
be bailees of certain property for which the drafts were drawn,
and agreed to sell the property, collect the proceeds and deposit
them in bank. Instead, they deposited the proceeds in the part-
nership account, and then failed. Knox offered a twenty per
cent composition to the firm and his individual creditors. This
was accepted, and the bank then filed its claim, after deducting
the twenty per cent, against the individual estate of Coe. It was
held that not only was the firm liable on the acceptances, but each
partner was liable severally as for a wrongful conversion, and
therefore the acceptance of the composition did not discharge
Coe from this several liability. As a dictum the Court said:
The Referee regarded the acceptance of the composition
as a bar to any claim of the bank against the individual es-
tate of Edward P. Coe, and so it would have been if the
liability asserted against his estate were for his contractual
liability on the acceptances as to which the partners were
jointly liable.
In the case of Curlee Clothing Co. v. Hamm,56 decided by the
Supreme Court of Arkansas, the note sued on was signed not
only by the partnership but by the individual defendant as well.
The partnership had been adjudicated and a composition offered
to the firm creditors only. This was accepted by the firm credi-
tors and notes were given to them. The assets scheduled in the
bankruptcy proceeding embraced only partnership property.
The court states that there was language in the order confirming
the composition which purported to discharge the individual
members of the firm from their individual indebtedness but that
"b See note 55.
"c See note 55.
(1923) 160 Ark. 483, 254 S. W. 818.
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such language should be regarded as surplusage. With the
record in this condition the court should have held that the indi-
vidual defendant was not discharged by the composition, either
because his obligation was individual and not a firm obligation
or because his individual assets had not been scheduled in the
bankruptcy proceedings. The court, however, although holding
that the defendant was not discharged, bases its ruling on the
broad ground that a discharge in bankruptcy of a partnership in
which the individual members are not adjudicated bankrupts
has no effect upon the individual liability of such members. It
is submitted that the decision is correct, but is placed on the
wrong grounds.
On the other hand, Abbott v. AndersonGT holds correctly that
a discharge of the firm discharged the partners individually
from firm debts, the decision being placed squarely on the au-
thority of Francis v. McNeal.
With the authorities in the unsatisfactory condition shown,
it is almost impossible to state what the law is. If it is within
the discretion of the trustee of the partnership estate to admin-
ister on the separate assets of the partners, then it would seem
to be necessary in each case to first see whether the trustee had
exercised his discretion and administered on the separate assets.
This does not seem to be a question which should be left to the
trustee's discretion. If the partnership assets are not sufficient
to satisfy the partnership creditors, then the latter certainly
have a right to proceed directly against any surplus remaining
of the individual assets of the partners after their individual
creditors have been satisfied. In other words, if the partnership
as an entity is insolvent, then it should be mandatory with the
trustee to proceed to administer the individual assets.
If the individual assets have been administered and the part-
nership creditors paid in full, or paid to the extent of the indi-
vidual and partnership assets, then a discharge of the bankrupt
firm upon its application should automatically discharge the in-
dividual partners from their liability as members of the firm to
partnership creditors.
If, on the other hand, the individual assets of the partners
- (1914) 265 Ill. 285, 106 N. E. 782.
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have not been administered in the bankruptcy court, a dis-
charge of the firm should not discharge the partners from their
liability to firm creditors. As a practical proposition, the referee
should require the partners to submit schedules of their indi-
vidual liabilities and 'assets in any case where the partnership
is adjudicated bankrupt. In this way firm creditors can pre-
vail upon the trustee to administer the individual assets for their
benefit. It has been shown above that where the act of bank-
ruptcy relied upon involves insolvency, a partnership can only
be adjudicated when the assets of the firm, plus the assets of
the partners after allowing for their individual debts, are not
sufficient in amount to pay firm creditors. It is certainly the
right of firm creditors in such a case to require that the surplus
of the assets of the individual partners after paying their indi-
vidual debts be brought into the bankruptcy court and admin-
istered by the trustee of the firm. If this is done, then certainly
it is the right of the individual partners to obtain their discharge
in the same proceedings from their individual liability as mem-
bers of the firm for firm debts. It should not be necessary in
such a case for the partners individually to apply for their sep-
arate discharges; the discharge of the firm should automatically
discharge them.
Proof of Claims and Marshaling
The court may permit the proof of the claim of the part-
nership estate against the individual estates, and vice versa,
and may marshal the assets of the partnership estate and
individual estates so as to prevent preferences and secure
the equitable distribution of the property of the several
estates.5 8
It has been held that this section prescribes only remedial
rights and does not affect any substantive rights given by sec. 23
(f) supra.59
In the Telfer case the firm and all the partners were adjudi-
cated bankrupts. The trustee of the firm filed a claim on a note
signed by G, one of the partners, against his separate estate in
"11 U. S. C. sec. 23 (g).
"In re Denning (D. C. Mass. 1902) 114 F. 219; In re Telfer (C. C. A. 6,
1910) 184 F. 224.
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an attempt to share equally with G's separate creditors. The
trustee claimed that the common law rule had been abrogated
by sec. 23 (g), but the Circuit Court of Appeals held that
the rule of distribution prescribed by Section 5 (f) is not
to be varied by anything permissible under Section 5 (g),
where the partnership and the individual members are all
adjudged bankrupts and the estates of all are before the
court, . . .
The converse of the above case is likewise true, namely, that
a trustee of one of the partners might prove his claim against
the firm estate for advances made to the firm, but could receive
no dividends until all other firm creditors had been paid in full.G0
Under the present Bankruptcy Act, where the partnership
and all the partners are adjudicated, claims may be filed against
both firm and individual estates as a matter of right, but
as to which estate shall pay, or be first devoted to payment,
is a matter of properly marshaling the assets
under the provisions of sec. 5 (f).61
Adjudication of Less Than all of the Partners
In the event of one or more, but not all, of the members
of a partnership being adjudged bankrupt, the partnership
property shall not be administered in bankruptcy unless by
consent of the partner or partners not adjudged bankrupt;
but such partner or partners not adjudged bankrupt shall
settle the partnership business as expeditiously as its nature
will permit, and account for the interest of the partner or
partners adjudged bankrupt.2
The Uniform Partnership Act" provides that dissolution of
the firm shall be caused "by the bankruptcy of any partner or
the partnership." This section of the Bankruptcy Act is but a
declaration of this common law rule, together with the added
provision that, unless all the partners consent, the firm property
cannot be administered in bankruptcy where less than all of the
'In re Rice (D. C. Pa. 1908) 164 F. 509; In re Effinger (D. C. Md. 1911)
184 F. 728.
"'In re Kardos (C. C. A. 2, 1927) 17 F. (2d) 706; Ft. Pitt Coal & Coke Co.
v. Diser (C. C. A. 6, 1917) 239 F. 443.
111 U. S. C. sec. 23 (h).
'Sec. 31 (5).
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partners are bankrupt. This section has caused much confusion
in the decisions, although a casual analysis reveals its real mean-
ing. Since the firm is an entity so far as its adjudication in
bankruptcy is concerned, its assets may not be administered if
it is not itself adjudicated, and if there is one partner not ad-
judicated, unless he consents . 4
Under the provisions of this section the right of the solvent
partner or partners to have the firm business and property ad-
ministered elsewhere than in the bankruptcy court is absolute,
unless waived.65
Conclusion
It is a noteworthy fact that the lower Federal Courts, with
the occasional assistance of the Supreme Court, have evolved a
fairly uniform bankruptcy law of partnership. The fact is note-
worthy because the law has been remarkably well settled in the
comparatively short space of thirty-one years, and because there
is so little conflict in the decisions. With so many Federal
Courts, one would expect to find a multitude of conflicting de-
cisions, but this is happily not the case.
The bankruptcy law of partnership is entirely a new concept
since the introduction of the "Entity Doctrine" in the 1898 Act.
The effort of this article has been to present some of the de-
cisions construing the Act, in an attempt to show that the law is
gradually weaving itself into an harmonious pattern.
"Mills v. J. H. Fisher & Co. (C. C. A. 6, 1908) 159 F. 897; Francis v.
McNeal, supra note 6; Sturm v. Ulrich (C. C. A. 8, 1925) 10 F. (2d) 9.
'Marnet Oil & Gas Co. v. Staley (C. C. A. 5, 1914) 218 F. 45; Collier,
BANKRUPTCY (8th ed.) 137.
Washington University Open Scholarship
